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 The ethos of our age is “the more data, the better.”1  In nearly 
every sector of our society, information technologies identify, track, 
analyze, and classify individuals by collecting and aggregating data.  
Law enforcement, agencies, industry, employers, hospitals, transporta-
tion providers, Silicon Valley, and individuals are all engaged in the 
pervasive collection and analysis of data that ranges from the mun-
dane to the deeply personal.2  Rather than being silos, these data ga-
thering and surveillance systems are linked, shared, and integrated.  
Whether referred to as coveillance,3 sousveillance,4 bureaucratic sur-
veillance,5 “surveillance-industrial complex,”6 “panvasive searches,”7 
or business intelligence, total-information awareness is the objective.8 
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 1 Kelley Stone, Deploying and Operating an Effective Regional Fusion Center: Lessons 
Learned from the North Central Texas Fusion System 6 (July 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
 2 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30. 
 3 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 144–48 (2012).    
 4 Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for 
Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 331 (2003) 
(describing personalized computer devices recording users’ activities). 
 5 JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 18, 119 (2001) (exploring surveillance of the poor to administer public 
benefits). 
 6 JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING BUSINESSES AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2004), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf (documenting industry’s partnership with 
government to engage in monitoring of citizens). 
 7 Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Surveillance, 82 MISS. L.J. 307 (2013). 
 8 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 317.  See generally INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE (INCLUDING 
TERRORISM) FUSION CENTERS 5 (Todd Masse et al. eds., 2008). 
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Consider Virtual Alabama.9  Google has built a customized data-
base for Alabama’s Department of Homeland Security that combines 
three-dimensional satellite/aerial imagery of the state with geospatial 
analytics that reveal relationships, trends, and patterns in incoming 
data.10  Virtual Alabama can “track moving objects, monitor sensors, 
and overlay near-real time data sets.”11  Alabama will continue to add 
inputs,12 but the system already aggregates data from traffic cameras, 
real-time private and public video streams, GPS location data for po-
lice cruisers, building schematics, sex offenders’ addresses, and land-
ownership records.13  The state’s 1500 public schools plan to link their 
video cameras into the system, providing live streaming 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week.14  Virtual Alabama is also encouraging contribu-
tions from government agencies in exchange for access to the system.15  
The stated goal of the program is to map all available data in the 
state.16 
Virtual Alabama is part of a broader surveillance system sponsored 
by federal, state, and local governments and their private partners.  In 
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Congress adopted a number of innova-
tions to break down ossified bureaucratic structures that previously 
impeded intelligence efforts to identify future threats.  Among these 
innovations was the creation of the new Department of Homeland Se-
curity.17  Amidst these efforts, the United States rejected proposals to 
establish an intelligence agency akin to Britain’s MI5, which is de-
voted to domestic intelligence and surveillance, due to bureaucratic in-
 9 See TORIN MONAHAN, SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 47 (2010); 
Google Earth Enterprise Case Study: Virtual Alabama, YOUTUBE (Sep. 24, 2008), http://www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=a-1I0JTWiIY. 
 10 MONAHAN, supra note 9, at 46–49. 
 11 2008 Innovation Awards Program Application, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS 1, http://ssl.csg.org 
/innovations/2008/2008Southapplications/08S05alvirtualalabama.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013). 
 12 Id. at 3. 
 13 Corey McKenna, Virtual Alabama Facilitates Data Sharing Among State and Local 
Agencies, DIGITAL COMMUNITIES (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles 
/virtual-alabama-facilitates-data-sharing-among.html. 
 14 Lamar Davis & Jacob Cook, Virtual Alabama School Safety System, http://rems.ed.gov/docs 
/fy10rems_fgm_nhmd_virtualalabama.pdf (last visited May 14, 2013).  Some states require public 
school students to carry Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) cards that track their 
whereabouts.  “Smart” Student ID Cards: Student Locator Pilot, NORTHSIDE ISD, 
http://www.nisd.net/studentlocator/ (last visited May 14, 2013) (describing Texas RFID program 
that tracks the location of students while at school). 
 15 Alabama’s Layered Approach, GCN (Oct. 17, 2008), http://gcn.com/articles/2008/10/17 
/alabamas-layered-approach.aspx?page=2. 
 16 MONAHAN, supra note 9, at 46. 
 17 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1442 (2011).  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  
264 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 126:262 
fighting and fear of a civil liberties firestorm.18  But what it eschewed 
formally, it pursued in fact. 
Since 9/11, a surveillance state has been in development,19 accom-
plished in part by a network of fusion centers through which govern-
ment agents and private-sector representatives “collect and share” in-
formation and intelligence.20  State- and locality-run fusion centers get 
most of their funding from federal grants.21  Their stated goal is to 
detect and prevent “all hazards, all crimes, all threats.”22  At the Wash-
ington Joint Analytical Center, for instance, analysts from the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the FBI, state police, and Boeing generate 
and analyze “criminal and anti-terrorism intelligence.”23 
Congressional panels, journalists, and citizens have been told that 
fusion centers raise few privacy concerns and that their information 
gathering is focused and valuable.24  Contrary to these assurances, 
critics have argued that fusion centers erode civil liberties without 
concomitant gains for security.25  A recent Congressional report backs 
these concerns, demonstrating that fusion centers have amounted to a 
waste of resources.26 
Fusion centers cast a wide and indiscriminate net.  Data-mining 
tools analyze a broad array of personal data culled from public- and 
private-sector databases, the Internet, and public and private video 
cameras.  Fusion centers access specially designed data-broker data-
bases containing dossiers on hundreds of millions of individuals, in-
cluding their Social Security numbers, property records, car rentals, 
credit reports, postal and shipping records, utility bills, gaming, insur-
ance claims, social network activity, and drug- and food-store 
records.27  Some gather biometric data and utilize facial-recognition 
software.28  On-the-ground surveillance is collected, analyzed, and 
shared as well.  For example, the San Diego fusion center purchased 
 18 Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and 
Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 377, 405-07 (2009). 
 19 Many observers argue that we already live in a surveillance state.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, 
Essay, The Constitution in the National Security State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 20 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1449 (exposing fusion centers as waste of resources and 
threat to civil liberties). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 1450. 
 23 Id. (quoting Alice Lipowicz, Boeing to Staff FBI Fusion Center, WASH. TECH. (June 1, 
2007), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2007/06/01/boeing-to-staff-fbi-fusion-center.aspx). 
 24 Id. at 1443. 
 25 See, e.g., id. at 1443 n.5. 
 26 See U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, MAJORITY AND MINORITY 
STAFF REPORT, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL 
FUSION CENTERS (2012), available at http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit 
/100312cc1.pdf [hereinafter MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT].   
 27 Id. 
 28 CITRON & PASQUALE, supra note 17, at 1451. 
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tiny cameras for law enforcement to attach to their shirt buttons, hats, 
and water bottles.29  Through the federal government’s “Information 
Sharing Environment,”30 information and intelligence is distributed to 
public entities, including state, local, and federal agencies, and private 
owners of “critical infrastructure,” such as transportation, medical, and 
telecommunications infrastructure.31 
The scope of surveillance capacities continues to grow.  Fusion cen-
ters and projects like Virtual Alabama may already have access to 
broadband providers’ deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, 
which store and examine consumers’ online activities and communica-
tions.32  This would provide government and private collaborators 
with a window into online activities,33 which could then be exploited 
using data-mining and statistical-analysis tools capable of revealing 
more about us and our lives than we are willing to share with even in-
timate family members.34  More unsettling still is the potential combi-
nation of surveillance technologies with neuroanalytics to reveal, pre-
dict, and manipulate instinctual behavioral patterns of which we are 
not even aware.35 
There can be no doubt that advanced surveillance technologies 
such as these raise serious privacy concerns.  In his article, Professor 
Neil Richards offers a framework to “explain why and when surveil-
lance is particularly dangerous and when it is not.”36  Richards con-
tends that surveillance of intellectual activities is particularly harmful 
because it can undermine intellectual experimentation, which the First 
Amendment places at the heart of political freedom.  Richards also 
raises concerns about governmental surveillance of benign activities 
because it gives undue power to governmental actors to unfairly classi-
fy, abuse, and manipulate those who are being watched; but it is clear 
that his driving concern is with intellectual privacy.  We think that this 
focus is too narrow. 
According to Richards, due to intellectual records’ relationship to 
First Amendment values, “surveillance of intellectual records — Inter-
 29 MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 79. 
 30 INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT, http://www.ise.gov/ (last visited May 14, 2013). 
 31 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1453 & n.68. 
 32 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet Inspection, in OFFICE OF 
THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, DEEP PACKET INSPECTION (Mar. 2009), 
available at http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2009/keats-citron_200903_e.asp.  
 33 Id.  Paul Ohm has carefully made the case for why DPI practices storing email 
communications would violate electronic surveillance laws.  Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of 
Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417. 
 34 See, e.g., Duhigg, supra note 2. 
 35 See Amanda C. Pustilnik, Neutrotechnologies at the Intersection of Criminal Procedure and 
Constitutional Law, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA (John T. Parry & L. Song Richardson eds., forthcoming 2013). 
 36 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).  
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net search histories, email, web traffic, or telephone communica- 
tions — is particularly harmful.”37  Richards argues that governmental 
surveillance seeking access to intellectual records should therefore be 
subjected to a high threshold of demonstrated need and suspicion be-
fore it is allowed by law.38  He argues also that individuals ought to be 
able to challenge in court “surveillance of intellectual activities.”39   
Richards further proposes that “a reasonable fear of government sur-
veillance that affects the subject’s intellectual activities (reading, think-
ing, and communicating) should be recognized as a harm sufficient to 
prove an injury in fact under standing doctrine.”40 
Richards is right to call for the protection of “intellectual priva-
cy.”41  Reflecting his concerns, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations recently reported internal Department of Ho-
meland Security warnings about agents routinely using fusion centers 
to collect intelligence on “First Amendment-protected activities lacking 
a nexus to violence or criminality,” including those of religious and po-
litical groups.42  One fusion center instructed law enforcement to col-
lect information on supporters of third-party candidates, including the 
public movements of cars with bumper stickers supporting Ron Paul 
and Bob Barr.43  Expressing the impact of this sort of surveillance on 
intellectual privacy, one political activist explained that he feared be-
ing pulled over by a police officer because of political views expressed 
by his bumper sticker.44  Although much fusion center surveillance 
remains hidden, Richards’s concerns are valid and pressing; in the 
present, as in the past, there can be no doubt that surveillance systems 
interfere with expressive activities. 
Although Richards aptly captures the dangers to intellectual free-
dom posed by technologically enhanced surveillance, we fear his policy 
prescriptions are both too narrow and too broad because they focus on 
“intellectual activities” as a necessary trigger and metric for judicial 
scrutiny of surveillance technologies.45  Our concerns run parallel to 
arguments we have made elsewhere against the so-called “mosaic 
 37 Id. at 1962. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 1963. 
 40 Id. at 1964. 
 41 See id. at 1935.  
 42 MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 26, at 36. 
 43 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1458; see also id. at 1458–63 (discussing the 
chilling of expressive activities and risk of erroneous classification of individuals raised by fusion 
centers’ surveillance of religious, political, and racial groups). 
 44 T.J. Greaney, ‘Fusion Center’ Data Draws Fire over Assertions, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., 
Mar. 14, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/local/fusion-center-data 
-draws-fire-over-assertions/article_b929741f-2302-5c1e-bcbd-1bc154375a8f.html. 
 45 Richards, supra note 36, at 1948. 
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theory” of quantitative privacy46 advanced by the D.C. Circuit47 and 
four Justices of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones.48  Our 
argument there supports our objection here: by focusing too much on 
what information is gathered rather than how it is gathered, efforts to 
protect reasonable expectations of privacy threatened by new and de-
veloping surveillance technologies will disserve the legitimate interests 
of both information aggregators and their subjects. 
One reason we are troubled by Richards’s focus on “intellectual ac-
tivities” as the primary trigger for regulating surveillance technology is 
that it dooms us to contests over which kinds of conduct, experiences, 
and spaces implicate intellectual engagement and which do not.49  Is 
someone’s participation in a message board devoted to video games 
sufficiently intellectual to warrant protection?  What about a telephone 
company’s records showing that someone made twenty phone calls in 
ten minutes’ time to a particular number without anyone picking up?  
Would we consider the route someone took going to the library an in-
tellectual activity?  Is it the form of the activity or what is being ac-
complished that matters most? 
Setting aside obvious practical concerns, the process of determining 
which things are intellectual necessarily raises the specter of oppres-
sion.  Courts and legislators would be required to select among com-
peting conceptions of the good life, marking some “intellectual” activi-
ties as worthy of protection, while denying that protection to other 
“non-intellectual” activities.  Inevitable contests over the content and 
scope of “intellectual privacy” will be, by their nature, subject to the 
whims and emergencies of the hour.50  In the face of terrorist threats, 
decisionmakers will surely promote a narrow definition of “intellectual 
privacy,” one that is capable of licensing programs like Virtual Ala-
bama and fusion centers.  Historically, decisionmakers have limited 
civil liberties in times of crisis and reversed course in times of peace,51 
but the post-9/11 period shows no sign of the pendulum’s swinging 
 46 David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy]; David Gray & Danielle 
Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Gray & 
Citron, Shattered Looking Glass]; David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, 
Fighting Cybercrime After United States v. Jones, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 
2013). 
 47 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 48 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 49 See Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. 311, 330-
53 (2012). 
 50 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 17, at 1479-80 (exploring the Schmittian “state of emergency” 
exceptionalism embraced in the post-9/11 era). 
 51 Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 350 
(2008).  
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back.  Given the nature of political and judicial decisionmaking in our 
state of perpetually heightened security, protection, even of “intellec-
tual privacy,” is most likely to be denied to the very outsiders, fringe 
thinkers, and social experimenters whom Richards is most concerned 
with protecting.52 
Richards might argue that his account of “intellectual privacy” and 
his definition of “intellectual activities” are sufficiently capacious to 
obviate these concerns.  Yet this very capaciousness proves our point.  
Whether “intellectual privacy” and “intellectual activities” will be read 
narrowly or broadly, and for that matter, what might constitute a nar-
row or broad reading, inevitably will be contested just as hotly as the 
borders of inclusion and exclusion.  To draw a loose parallel, the de-
bates among legal positivists and natural law theorists did not abate 
when Hart expanded the descriptive scope of positivism53 or when 
Dworkin did the same for naturalism.54  To the contrary, they simply 
expanded the number of battlefronts so that we now see bloody con-
tests within both camps as well as between them. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the weight of these sorts of 
concerns in the context of Fourth Amendment debates.  For example, 
in Kyllo v. United States, the Court was invited to limit Fourth 
Amendment protection to activities in the home that can be regarded 
as “intimate.”55  Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia demurred pre-
cisely because he thought the Court had neither the qualifications nor 
the authority to determine what is and is not “intimate.”56  He there-
fore focused on the invasiveness of the technology itself — a heat de-
tection device — and its potential to render a wide range of activities 
in the home, whether “intimate” or not, subject to government surveil-
lance.57  By our lights, this is a wise path to follow.  Although we find 
persuasive Richards’s description of the harms inflicted by totalizing 
surveillance on intellectual privacy, we are not persuaded that the law 
should use “intellectual activities” as a trigger for judicial scrutiny or 
as a special category for judicial treatment any more than the Court 
should use “intimacy” as a signal for Fourth Amendment regulation. 
Rather than assigning primary importance to “intellectual activi-
ties” and presumably providing less protection against the acknowl-
 52 These concerns — political grudges as well as crisis overreach — animated the Church 
Commission’s support of FISA after the intelligence surveillance abuses of the COINTELPRO 
era.  Brief of Former Church Committee Members and Staff as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents and Affirmance at 13, 18, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-1025, 2012 WL 
4480741, at *13, *18 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2013).      
 53 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). 
 54 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 55 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001). 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. 
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edged perils of broader types of surveillance, the law’s focus should be 
on the dangers of totalizing surveillance.  Information privacy scho-
lars58 and surveillance studies theorists59 alike have long adhered to 
this approach, and for good reason.  Technologies like Virtual Alabama 
and the fusion-center network amass, link, analyze, and share mass 
quantities of information about individuals, much of which is quoti-
dian.  What is troubling about these technologies is not what informa-
tion they gather, but rather the broad, indiscriminate, and continuous 
nature of the surveillance they facilitate.60  Video cameras may be 
trained on street corners, drugstore aisles, or a school’s bathroom en-
trances.  The information they gather likely does not implicate intellec-
tual activities.  They nonetheless create and sustain the kind of surveil-
lance state that is anathema to liberty and democratic culture.61  
Fusion centers rely upon data-broker dossiers, much of which has 
nothing to do with intellectual endeavors.  There is no doubt, however, 
that continuously streaming all of this information into the informa-
tion-sharing environment facilitates the sort of broad and indiscrimi-
nate surveillance that is characteristic of a surveillance state. 
In assessing the privacy interests threatened by such totalizing sur-
veillance, we have in mind some of the lessons taught by Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis in their foundational article The Right to Pri-
vacy.62  Of course, the surveillance technologies of their era could only 
record discrete slices of life.  Nonetheless, Warren and Brandeis recog-
nized that emerging surveillance capacities threatened individuals’ in-
terests in being “let alone” in their “private life, habits, acts, and rela-
tions.”63  In Warren and Brandeis’s view, the watchful eye of “any 
other modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds” in-
terfered with the development of a person’s “inviolate personality.”64  
In discussing a husband’s note to his son that he did not dine with his 
wife — a pedestrian communication by any measure — Warren and 
Brandeis explained that the privacy interest protected was “not the in-
tellectual act of recording the fact that the husband did not dine with 
 58 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 141 (2012); Julie E. 
Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 195 (2008). 
 59 See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty, Tear Down the Walls: On Demolishing the Panopticon, in 
THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE 23 (David Lyon ed., 2006); David Lyon, From Big Brother to the 
Electronic Panopticon, in THE ELECTRONIC EYE 57 (1994); Roger A. Clarke, Information 
Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498 (1988). 
 60 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46, at 8 & n.45.  We are inspired to use this 
formulation by Susan Freiwald.  See Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/context/susan_freiwald/article/1012/type/native 
/viewcontent.  
 61 See generally Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46. 
 62 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 63 Id. at 193, 216. 
 64 Id. at 205–06. 
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his wife,” but the unwanted observance of the “domestic occurrence” 
itself.65  Of course, these are precisely the concerns echoed by Justice 
Scalia on behalf of the Court in Kyllo.66 
The threat posed by contemporary surveillance technologies lies in 
how much and how often people are watched.  Modern technologies 
allow observers to detect, gather, and aggregate mass quantities of da-
ta about mundane daily acts and habits as well as “intellectual” ones.67  
The continuous and indiscriminate surveillance they accomplish is 
damaging because it violates reasonable expectations of quantitative 
privacy, by which we mean privacy interests in large aggregations of 
information that are independent from particular interests in constitu-
ent parts of that whole.68  To be sure, the harms that Richards links to 
intellectual privacy are very much at stake in recognizing a right to 
quantitative privacy.  But rather than being a function of the kind of 
information gathered, we think that the true threats to projects of self-
development and democratic culture lie in the capacity of new and de-
veloping technologies to facilitate a surveillance state. 
In adopting this view, we ally ourselves in part with commitments 
to a quantitative account of Fourth Amendment privacy promoted by 
at least five Justices of the Supreme Court last Term in United States 
v. Jones.69  In Jones, police officers investigating drug trafficking in 
and around the District of Columbia attached a GPS-enabled tracking 
device on defendant Jones’s car.  By monitoring his movements over 
the course of a month, investigators were able to document both the 
patterns and the particulars of his travel, which played a critical role 
in his ultimate conviction.  Although the Court resolved Jones on the 
narrow grounds of physical trespass, five justices wrote or joined con-
curring opinions showing sympathy for the proposition that citizens 
hold reasonable expectations of privacy in large quantities of data, 
even if they lack reasonable expectations of privacy in the constitutive 
parts of that whole.70  Thus, they would have held that Jones had a 
reasonable expectation in the aggregate of data documenting his public 
movements over the course of four weeks, even though he did not have 
any expectation of privacy in his public movements on any particular 
afternoon.71 
 65 Id. at 201. 
 66 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2001) (Fourth Amendment is concerned with 
protecting sanctity of the home, not with protecting certain domestic activities over others). 
 67 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1832–33 
(2010). 
 68 See Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46. 
 69 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 70 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 71 See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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The account of quantitative privacy advanced by the Jones concur-
rences has much in common with the views promoted by Warren and 
Brandeis.  Specifically, the concurring Justices in Jones expressed wor-
ry that by “making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Gov-
ernment, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” programs of 
broad and indiscriminate surveillance will “chill[] associational and 
expressive freedoms,” and “alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to a democratic society.”72  Their 
concerns are well-grounded in original understandings of the Fourth 
Amendment.73  As Professor William Stuntz has shown, the Fourth 
Amendment was drafted partly in reaction to eighteenth-century cases 
involving the British government’s use of general warrants to seize 
personal diaries and letters in support of seditious-libel prosecutions 
that were designed to suppress political thought.74  Despite these roots, 
quantitative privacy is just beginning to receive recognition because it 
is only now under threat of extinction by technologies like Virtual Ala-
bama and fusion centers. 
There are two ways we might seek to protect quantitative privacy 
in an age of expanding surveillance technology.  One strategy would 
focus on the aggregations of information assembled with respect to a 
particular person.  This “mosaic” approach presents serious practical 
concerns along the lines we described with regard to intellectual priva-
cy.75  As Professor Orin Kerr asks, where would we draw the line be-
tween aggregations that are and are not too invasive?76  How would 
we treat discrete aggregations assembled by different actors if the sum 
of those wholes would cross the invasiveness threshold, wherever it is 
drawn?77  More importantly, we do not see how this approach could 
actually preserve reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy.  The 
harm is done, after all, by being watched in a totalizing way — or by 
the awareness that one might be so watched.78  Limiting the scope of 
information dossiers does little to address those concerns.  In light of 
these challenges, we have argued elsewhere for regulating the technol-
ogies themselves.79  Our arguments there strongly suggest that Ri-
 72 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73 See generally Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46. 
 74 William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 394 
(1995). 
 75 For an extended discussion of the mosaic theory, see Gray & Citron, Shattered Looking 
Glass, supra note 46. 
 76 Kerr, supra note 44, at 333–36.  
 77 Id. 
 78 See generally Gray & Citron, Shattered Looking Glass, supra note 46. 
 79 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46. 
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chards’s goal of protecting intellectual privacy would also be better 
served by adopting a technology-centered approach. 
Of course, none of this argument is intended to discount the bene-
fits of surveillance to national security, criminal justice, emergency re-
sponse, public administration, or medical care.80  As Richards ob-
serves, any account of surveillance’s privacy harms is often resisted on 
the grounds that some surveillance is essential for the public good.  
But there is a line between surveillance that is essential for the public 
good and invasive total-information awareness technologies, and that 
line is easy to cross if unattended.  This leaves us with the question of 
how to protect society from the gradual acceptance and institutionali-
zation of total-information awareness technologies.  Richards supports 
allowing individuals to challenge surveillance of intellectual activities 
in court as a cognizable harm.  Here again, we worry that his proposal 
is unlikely to preserve the fundamental interests at stake. 
Richards proposes to grant individuals standing to challenge go-
vernmental surveillance.81  Putting concerns about the constitutionali-
ty of such a challenge aside, his proposal may raise practical problems.  
Granting individuals standing to challenge governmental surveillance 
of them would overwhelm the courts.  There are not enough judicial 
resources to adjudicate three hundred million such suits, each of which 
could be renewed — almost as soon as it is resolved — on nothing 
more than suspicion of continued surveillance because the focus, under 
Richards’s approach, is on what information is being gathered.  The 
possibility of a class action would not help matters because individual 
issues of harm attached to what particular information is gathered 
would predominate.82  Suits are also bound to be met with claims of 
national security interest, to which courts routinely show considerable 
deference.83  For example, in litigation involving police surveillance of 
protestors at the 2004 Republican National Convention, the Second 
Circuit refused to allow discovery of officers’ field reports, even in re-
dacted form, because they would reveal information about undercover 
operations and thus potentially hinder future ones.84 
What is more, lawsuits designed to uncover surveillance of intellec-
tual activities may be unable to identify the “intellectual records” ga-
thered by government due to the way certain surveillance systems op-
 80 Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 46.  
 81 This proposal would of course need to overcome or distinguish itself from the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-1025, 2013 WL 673253 (U.S. Feb. 
26, 2013). 
 82 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 83 David Kravets, Courts, Congress Shun Addressing Legality of Warrantless Eavesdropping, 
WIRED (Jan. 29, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/legality-of 
-warrantless-eavesdropping/. 
 84 In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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erate.  Fusion centers, for instance, may access and analyze private 
and public databases and real-time video feeds without ever creating 
and storing records.  Although fusion center surveillance of all indi-
viduals’ on and offline activities is continuous and totalizing, it does 
not necessarily produce records that could be packaged and produced 
as part of a discovery process.  Ultimately, the vastness of contempo-
rary governmental total-information awareness renders the judiciary 
incapable of reviewing the majority of situations on an individual ba-
sis.  Furthermore, any individual cases that made it to judgment could 
no more chip away at discrete instances of governmental surveillance.  
Because they would focus on the intellectual privacy interests of spe-
cific litigants, these cases would not and could not challenge the sys-
tem of totalizing surveillance as a whole. 
Here again, we think that a technology-centered approach that 
seeks to protect quantitative privacy is far more promising.  Not only 
would it avoid the constitutional and practical challenges of individual 
litigation based on the trigger and metric of intellectual privacy, a fo-
cus on the technology would also open the door to a wide range of al-
ternative regulatory frameworks that could more efficiently and relia-
bly strike a reasonable compromise between the legitimate interests of 
government and the privacy interests of citizens.85  For example, an 
independent board of experts, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB), could perform an analysis of the privacy 
and civil liberties risks posed by surveillance technologies.86  PCLOB, 
now fully staffed,87 could mandate safeguards for the use of surveil-
lance technologies that raise the specter of a surveillance state and 
make recommendations based on their privileged access to security 
analyses, piercing the veil secrecy that Richards laments.88  Board 
members, vetted for top-secret national security clearances, could at-
tain a comprehensive view of domestic surveillance technologies that 
 85 Gray & Citron, Quantitative Privacy, supra note 46. 
 86 The PCLOB is an independent agency established by Congress to advise the President and 
other executive branch officials on matters concerning the protection of privacy.  See Danielle K. 
Citron, Needed Steps Forward on the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 12, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com 
/archives/2012/01/needed-steps-forward-on-the-privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board.html. 
 87 After years of vacancy, in August 2012 the Senate unanimously confirmed four of President 
Obama’s nominees to PCLOB: Rachel Brand, Elisabeth Cook, Jim Dempsey, and Judge Patricia 
Wald.  Michael Daniel et al., Senate Confirms Four Nominees to Privacy & Civil Liberties Board, 
OSTP BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/08/03/senate 
-confirms-four-nominees-privacy-civil-liberties-board.  The President’s nominee for the Board’s 
chair, David Medine, was finally confirmed in early May 2013, which means PCLOB is fully 
operational.  See Allison Grande, Restored Privacy Board Lends Crucial Eye to Data Prac-
tices, LAW360 (May 9, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2013/05/5.9.2013_Law360_SBF_PCLOBChair.pdf 
 88 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 19, at 1488–89. 
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would enable them to recommend procedural protections for quantita-
tive privacy to prevent governmental abuse.89  Such procedural pro-
tections would by nature protect the intellectual privacy interests at 
the heart of Richards’s proposal without the drawbacks of using intel-
lectual privacy as a trigger and metric of action. 
Although we live in a world of total surveillance, we need not ac-
cept its dangers — at least not without a fight.  As Richards rightly 
warns, unconstrained surveillance can be profoundly harmful to intel-
lectual privacy.  It would be wrong, however, to conflate symptom and 
cure.  What is most concerning, for us is the rapid adoption of technol-
ogies that increasingly facilitate persistent, continuous, and indiscrimi-
nate monitoring of our daily lives.  Although harms to intellectual pri-
vacy are certainly central to our understanding of the interests at 
stake, it is this specter of a surveillance state that we think ought to be 
the center of judicial, legislative, and administrative solutions, not the 
particular intellectual privacy interests of individuals. 
 
 
 89 Id. at 1473.  For instance, they could require immutable audit logs that promote 
governmental interest in national security with a commitment to “watch the watchers” by 
recording all of the uses of that technology. 
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